Western New England Law Review
Volume 28 28 (2005-2006)
Issue 1

Article 6

12-16-2009

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—IS 18 U.S.C.§
922(o)(1) CONSTITUTIONAL? MERE
POSSESSION OF SELF-CREATED OBJECTS
AND THE REACH OF THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE
Karen A. Michalson

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Karen A. Michalson, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—IS 18 U.S.C.§ 922(o)(1) CONSTITUTIONAL? MERE POSSESSION OF SELFCREATED OBJECTS AND THE REACH OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, 28 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 133 (2005),
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss1/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Is 18 U.S.c. § 922(0)(1) CONSTITU
TIONAL? MERE POSSESSION OF SELF-CREATED OBJECTS AND THE
REACH OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
INTRODUCTION
Robert Wilson Stewart was in the business of selling rifle as
sembly parts kits.1 Because Stewart had previously been convicted
for possessing and transferring a machine gun? the Bureau of Alco
hol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) investigated Stewart's
business and obtained a federal warrant to search Stewart's resi
dence. 3 During its search, the ATF found five machine guns that
Stewart had fabricated from parts that had traveled through inter
state channels.4 Stewart was convicted in the United States District
Court for the District of Arizona of "five counts of unlawful posses
sion of a machinegun5 in violation of 18 U.S.c. § 922(0)."6
Under 18 U.S.c. § 922(0)(1) it is "unlawful for any person to
transfer or possess a machinegun."7 The history behind earlier gun
1. United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated and re
manded, 125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005). On June 13, 2005, the Supreme Court remanded this
case to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit "for further consideration in light of"
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). United States v. Stewart, 125 S. Ct. 2899
(2005). Section IV of this Note discusses Gonzales and this remand.
2. A machine gun is legally defined as "any weapon which shoots, is designed to
shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without
manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger." I.R.e. § 5845(b) (2003).
3. Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1133.
4. Id. at 1134-35.
5. A "machine gun" is "a gun that fires small-arms ammunition automatically and
can keep up a rapid fire of bullets." However, "machinegun" means "to fire at with a
machine gun." THE WORLD BOOK DICfIONARY 1238 (1971). I have retained this stan
dard English usage throughout, except in situations like the present where I am quoting
without alteration from an original source, and the source uses "machinegun" instead of
"machine gun."
6. Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1132, 1134.
7. The entire subsection reads:
(0) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), it shall be unlawful for any person
to transfer or possess a machinegun.
(2) This subsection does not apply with respect to
(A) a transfer to or by, or possession by or under the authority of, the United
States or any department or agency thereof or a State, or a department,
agency, or political subdivision thereof; or
(B) any lawful transfer or lawful possession of a machinegun that was lawfully
possessed before the date this subsection takes effect.
18 U.S.c. § 922(0) (2000) (effective May 19, 1986).

133

134

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:133

control legislation indicates that Congress passed such legislation
under the Commerce Clauses in an attempt to control interstate
commerce in firearms.9 However, when Stewart appealed his con
viction, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the
Commerce Clause does not give Congress the authority to "regu
late someone with no relation to interstate commerce at all-such
as a person who builds a machine gun from scratch in his garage
...."10 This ruling broke with earlier decisions by several courts of
appeals, including the Ninth Circuit, that the Commerce Clause
does reach to mere possession of a machine gun.!1
This Note examines this circuit split in detail by focusing on
two related issues. The first issue is whether 18 U.S.c. § 922(0)(1)
is constitutional under the Commerce Clause. The second issue is
whether Congress ever has authority under the Commerce Clause
to ban the mere possession of an object that was created from parts
that moved in interstate commerce. Such bans have been limited so
8. u.s. CaNsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 1,3. The Constitution provides that "The Congress
shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce ... among the several States ...." Id.
9. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified at 18 U.s.c. §§ 921-30 (2000)) was buttressed by the fol
lowing legislative findings:
[E]xisting Federal controls over such traffic [in firearms] do not adequately
enable the States to control this traffic within their own borders through the
exercise of their police power ... only through adequate Federal control over
interstate and foreign commerce in these weapons ... can this grave problem
[of dangerous people obtaining firearms] be properly dealt with, and effective
State and local regulation of this traffic be made possible ... the lack of ade
quate Federal control over interstate and foreign commerce in highly destruc
tive weapons ... has allowed such weapons ... to fall into the hands of lawless
persons ... thus creating a problem of national concern ....
S. REp. No. 90-1097, at 19-20 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,2197-99. The
"principal purpose" of the Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213
(1968) (codified at 18 U.S.c. §§ 921-30 (2000)) was to "strengthen Federal controls over
interstate and foreign commerce in firearms and to assist the States effectively to regu
late firearms traffic within their borders." H.R. REP. No. 90-1577, at 6 (1968), reprinted
in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4411.
10. Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1141.
11. United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 1997), rehearing
granted in part, opinion vacated in irrelevant part; sentence affd, 133 F.3d 1412 (11th
Cir. 1998); United States v. Knutson, 113 F.3d 27 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 285 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781, 787
(6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 891 (7th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791, 797 (5th
Cir. 1995), rehearing en bane granted, 78 F.3d 160 (5th Cir 1996), and on rehearing en
bane, 105 F.3d 997 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1522 (10th Cir.
1995); United States v. Pearson, 8 F.3d 631, 633 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hale,
978 F.2d 1016, 1018 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir.
1991).
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far to machine guns and child pornography.12 Although these items
provoke highly negative emotional reactions in many people, the
constitutionality of the way in which Congress has used the Com
merce Clause to support such bans merits dispassionate discussion.
Millions of Americans possess objects that they created out of com
ponents that moved in interstate commerce, objects such as self
designed clothing, meals, decorations, electronic devices, vehicles,
and a host of other items as numerous and varied as the individuals
who produced, and now possess, them. Whether the Commerce
Clause reaches to the mere possession of such items, that is, into the
private domain of nearly every American, is therefore worthy of
examination.
This Note has four sections. Section I outlines the historical
background of the Commerce Clause's application to gun control
legislation in general, and to gun possession in particular. Section
II discusses the current circuit split on the constitutionality of 18
U.S.c. § 922(0)(1), and argues that the Commerce Clause does not
give Congress the authority to outlaw the mere possession of a ma
chine gun. Section III examines whether the Commerce Clause
ever gives Congress the power to ban the possession of any self
created item whose components moved in interstate commerce, and
argues that the Commerce Clause does not give Congress that au
thority. Section IV discusses the Supreme Court's recent decision
to remand Stewart for "further consideration in light of" Gonzales
v. Raich,B and argues that Gonzales does not apply to self-created
objects.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE'S
RELATIONSHIP TO GUN CONTROL LEGISLATION

A.

The National Firearms Act of 1934, the Taxing Power, and
Firearms Possession

The earliest federal gun control legislation was the National
Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA).14 Congress intended the NFA to
12. Under 18 U.S.c.A. § 22S2(a)(4)(B) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004), it is unlawful to
"knowingly possess[] ... matter ... contain[ing] any visual depiction ... which was
produced using materials which have been ... transported [in interstate or foreign com
merce] ... if- (i) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct
"
13. United States v. Stewart, 125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005) (referencing Gonzales v.
Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005».
14. National Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 474, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (superseded by
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"provide for the taxation of manufacturers, importers, and dealers
in certain firearms and machine guns, to tax the sale or other dispo
sal of such weapons, and to restrict importation and regulate inter
state transportation thereof. "15 In accordance with Congress's
intent, the NFA required "every importer, manufacturer, and
dealer in firearms" to "register with the collector of internal reve
nue for each district in which such business is to be carried on ...
and pay a special tax ...."16 The NFA also required "every person
possessing a firearm [to] register, with the collector of the district in
which he resides ...."17 The NFA further regulated firearm posses
sion by making it "unlawful for any person to receive or possess any
firearm which has at any time been transferred in violation of" the
NFA's tax and registration requirements.1 8
During congressional hearings concerning the NFA, there was
disagreement over whether Congress had any constitutional author
ity for prohibiting firearms possession.1 9 Representative David J.
Lewis, a Maryland Democrat, asked Attorney General Homer S.
Cummings, who originally wanted the NFA bill to proceed under
both the commerce and the taxing power,20 how such a bill could
avoid violating the constitutional right to keep and bear arms.21
Cummings replied that the Constitution did not give Congress the
power to prohibit mere possession of a machine gun: "You see, if
we made a statute absolutely forbidding any human being to have a
machine gun, you might say there is some constitutional question
involved."22 Cummings then explained that although the mere pos
session of machine guns could not be constitutionally prohibited, it
could be constitutionally regulated under the taxing power. 23
Later in the hearings, the following exchange concerning
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939; codified as ch. 53 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954; codified as amended at I.R.e. § 5801-72 (2003)).
15. Id. at 1236.
16. § 2(a), 48 Stat. at 1237.
17. § 5(a), 48 Stat. at 1238.
18. § 6, 48 Stat. at 1238.
19. National Firearms Act: Hearings on H.R. 9006 Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 73d Congo 99-100 (1934) [hereinafter 1934 House Firearms Hearings].
20. /d. at 6. The Constitution provides that "The Congress shall have Power To
lay and collect Taxes ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
21. 1934 House Firearms Hearings, supra note 19, at 19. The Constitution pro
vides that "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S.
CONST. amend. II.
22. 1934 House Firearms Hearings, supra note 19, at 19 (statement of Att'y Gen.
Cummings).
23.

[d.
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whether Congress could constitutionally ban possession of machine
guns occurred between Representative Allen T. Treadway, who was
a Republican from Massachusetts, and Assistant Attorney General
Joseph B. Keenan:
MR. TREADWAY: What benefit is there in allowing ma
chine guns to be legally recognized at all? Why not exclude them
from manufacture?
MR. KEENAN: We have not the power to do that under the
Constitution of the United States. Can the Congressman suggest
under what theory we could prohibit the manufacture of machine
guns?
MR. TREADWAY: You could prohibit anybody from own
ing them.
MR. KEENAN: I do not think we can prohibit anybody
from owning them. I do not think that power resides in
Congress.24

The NFA was modified in committee to eliminate all Com
merce Clause provisions and to become purely a tax regulation re
quiring firearms registration. 25
As Cummings explained in his exchange with Lewis, although
it is constitutionally questionable to ban machine gun possession,
"when you say, 'We will tax the machine gun,' ... you are easily
within the law."26 Congress therefore sought to avoid future consti
tutional challenges to the NFA by regulating machine gun posses
sion solely through the taxing power.
Nevertheless, there was a challenge to the constitutionality of
the NFA's regulation of firearms possessionP In Sonzinsky v.
United States, the appellant, Max Sonzinsky, had been convicted of
violating the NFA by possessing a sawed-off shotgun without hav
ing obtained the required written order28 from the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. 29 Sonzinsky argued on appeal that the NFA was
24. Id. at 100 (statements of Rep. Treadway and Assistant Att'y Gen. Keenan).
25. Id. at 86.
26. 1d. at 19 (statement of Att'y Gen. Cummings).
27. Sonzinsky v. United States, 86 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1936), affd, 300 U.S. 506
(1937).
28. "It shall be unlawful for any person to transfer a firearm except in pursuance
of a written order from the person seeking to obtain such article, on an application form
issued in blank in duplicate for that purpose by the Commissioner [of Internal Reve
nue]." National Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 474, § 4(a), 48 Stat. 1236, 1237-38 (1934)
(superseded by the Internal Revenue Code of 1939; codified as ch. 53 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954; codified as amended at 1.R.c. § 5801-72 (2003».
29. Sonzinsky, 86 F.2d at 487.
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invalid because its true purpose was crime suppression, not revenue
raising. 30 Sonzinsky asserted that the NFA was unconstitutional be
cause it was not a taxation law but a penal law in disguise that en
croached on the states' police power. 31 It is notable that Sonzinsky
never questioned the constitutionality of a tax law regulating mere
possession of a firearm.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that sec
tion 6 of the NFA only prohibits possession of a firearm that was
transferred in violation of sections 3 or 4 of the NFA.32 Therefore,
Sonzinsky could not be convicted for possessing a firearm without
the required written order, because "mere proof that the defendant
had not obtained blanks [forms] from the collector fell far short of
proof that such firearm had been transferred 'not in pursuance of a
written order,' as charged in the second count of the indictment."33
The court therefore reversed Sonzinsky's conviction on the posses
sion charge on evidentiary grounds. 34 However, it rejected Son
zinsky's constitutional argument, holding that the tax imposed by
the NFA "can reasonably be said to be for the purpose of producing
revenue .... It is unimportant, under such circumstances, that such
levy may at the same time impose a degree of regulation."35
Two things are clear from the court's rulings in Sonzinsky.
First, it is clear that that the taxing power under which the NFA was
passed is indeed constitutionally sufficient to regulate firearm pos
session. In fact, no one questioned whether the taxing power
reached possession. Sonzinsky's argument that the NFA was not a
tax statute demonstrates that he implicitly accepted that the taxing
power reaches possession. 36 Second, it is clear that that the NFA's
regulation of firearm possession was to apply narrowly to individu
als who possess firearms as a proximate result of an illegal transfer.
That is, Sonzinsky could not be convicted of possessing a firearm
without proof that he possessed that firearm as a direct result of it
having been transferred illegally.37
In brief, although the taxing power does reach firearm posses
sion via the NFA, the taxing power has not been held to extend to
30.
3l.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 490.
at
at
at
at

488.
489.
489, 49l.
490.

at 488-89.
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the possession of a firearm absent an illegal transfer. Therefore,
mere possession of a firearm was never prohibited by the NFA.
B.

The Federal Firearms Act of 1938 and the Failure of the
Commerce Clause to Reach Firearms Possession

The first federal gun control legislation to be enacted under
Congress's Commerce Clause authority was the Federal Firearms
Act of 1938 (FFA).38 The FFA made it unlawful for any "manufac
turer or dealer, except a manufacturer or dealer having a license
issued under the provisions of this Act, to transport, ship, or receive
any firearm or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce. "39
The FFA also made it unlawful "for any person to receive any fire
arm or ammunition transported or shipped in interstate or foreign
commerce in violation of" the manufacturer's or dealer's licensing
requirements. 4o The FFA, unlike the NFA, only made unlawful the
receipt of a firearm that was shipped in interstate commerce in vio
lation of federal licensing requirements. 41
The FFA did not make it unlawful to possess a firearm under
any circumstance. It did, however, state that the "possession of a
firearm . . . by any [person convicted of a violent crime or by a
fugitive from justice] shall be presumptive evidence that such fire
arm ... was shipped or transported or received, as the case may be,
by such person in violation of this Act."42 The FFA also stated that
possession of "any firearm from which the manufacturer's serial
number has been removed, obliterated, or altered ... shall be pre
sumptive evidence that such firearm was transported, shipped, or
received, as the case may be, by the possessor in violation of this
Act."43
It is important to underscore here that possession of a firearm
was regulated under the NFA, which was passed under the taxing
power, but not under the FFA, which was passed under the Com
merce Clause. The FFA made it unlawful to receive a firearm that
was shipped in interstate commerce in violation of FFA require
ments.44 However, the FFA only made it "presumptive evidence"
of an FFA violation to possess a firearm while belonging to one or
38. Federal Firearms Act of 1938, PUb. L. No. 785, 52 Stat. 1250 (repealed 1968).
39. § 2(a), 52 Stat. at 1250.
40. § 2(b), 52 Stat. at 1250.
41. Id.
42. § 2(f), 52 Stat. at 1251.
43. § 2(i), 52 Stat. at 1251.
44. § 2(b), 52 Stat. at 1250.
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more narrowly defined groups of people, or to possess a firearm
lacking a manufacturer's serial number. 45 The same FFA subsec
tions that prohibit receipt merely make possession presumptive evi
dence of a violation. 46 It follows that Congress chose not to use the
FFA to prohibit the possession of firearms, including machine guns,
even though Congress did use the FFA to prohibit other kinds of
firearms activities.
Even if the congressional hearings concerning the NFA had
not made it clear that the Constitution fails to give Congress the
power to prohibit people from possessing firearms,47 congressional
discussions preceding the passage of the FFA show a reluctance to
ban firearm possession for other reasons. The Senate Committee
on Commerce stated in its report that there was an "outstanding
necessity" to regulate and control the "interstate shipment of fire
arms and ammunition" because there were millions of pistols in the
United States, many of them imports, and there was a need to
"eliminate the gun from the crooks' hands."48 Congress passed the
FFA under the commerce power because Congress decided that the
most effective way to cope with this "firearm situation" and thereby
reduce crime, was to control interstate firearms shipments. 49 How
ever, the committee also recognized that Congress must interfere
"as little as possible with the law-abiding citizen from whom pro
tests have been received against any attempt to take from him his
means of protection from the outlaws who have rendered living
conditions unbearable in the past decade. "50
This tension over writing a constitutional law that would effec
tively prevent criminals but not law-abiding citizens from possessing
firearms is also apparent in an earlier congressional debate. 51 Sena
tor Royal S. Copeland, a New York Democrat, stated in the Con
gressional Record that the original version of the proposed bill met
with considerable "opposition [from] sportsmen and other respecta
ble citizens" who owned firearms. 52 In response to what Copeland
described as "bitter opposition to the previous bill" and "innumera
ble letters indicating such opposition," Congress formulated a new
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

§ 2(f), (i), 52 Stat. at 1251.
Id.
1934 House Firearms Hearings, supra note 23.
S. REP. No. 75-82, at 1-2 (1937).
Id.
/d. at 2.
79 CONGo REC. S11973 (1935).
Id. (statement of Sen. Copeland).
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bill that incorporated contributions from the Rifle Association, the
Pistol Association, and Congress's own experts. 53 It was no doubt
due to pressure from organized groups of law-abiding gun owners
that Congress decided that the FFA would defer to the states on the
issue of regulating possession of firearms. 54 As Copeland explained
to Senator William E. Borah, an Idaho Republican, the purpose of
the FFA was to aid the states in their law enforcement efforts, not
to federally ban firearms possession:
MR. COPELAND: If a gun is shipped into a State where a
license is required to have possession of a firearm, it can not be
lawfully received except by a person who has such a license. It
does not apply at all to other States which do not require
licenses.
MR. BORAH: In other words, it is simply in aid of the
States to enforce their law?
MR. COPELAND: That is correct.
MR. BORAH: And is nothing more than that?
MR. COPELAND: That is its purpose. 55

Copeland also explained that because criminals would not have
state licenses to carry guns, the FFA would make it difficult for
criminals to get possession of firearms shipped through interstate
channels, but at the same time would allow law-abiding citizens to
possess firearms. 56 Copeland did not address how the FFA would
prevent criminals who lived in states that did not require a license
to possess a firearm from gaining possession of firearms shipped in
interstate commerce. It is logical to assume, however, that because
the purpose of the FFA was to help the states enforce their laws,57
Congress chose not to address the issue of those states that had no
gun licensing laws to enforce.
It follows then, that when Congress passed the FFA in 1938,
constitutional issues and strong political pressures caused it to re
frain from banning firearms possession.

53. Id. (statement of Sen. Copeland).
54. "If a State does not choose to have a licensing law, the bill does not apply to
such State, but it does apply to those States which have licensing laws." Id. (statement
of Sen. Copeland).
55. Id. (statements of Sens. Copeland and Borah).
56. /d. (statement of Sen. Copeland).
57.

Id.
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The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and
Congress's Lack of Findings Regarding Firearms
Possession and Interstate Commerce

In 1968, Congress repealed the FFA58 and passed the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Omnibus Act), which
included almost all of the provisions of the FFA.59 The Omnibus
Act, like the FFA, was enacted under Congress's commerce
power. 60 The Omnibus Act made it unlawful "for any person, ex
cept a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer,
to engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in
firearms, or ammunition, or in the course of such business to ship,
transport, or receive any firearm or ammunition in interstate or for
eign commerce. "61
The Omnibus Act's prohibition of unlicensed persons from
manufacturing or dealing in firearms expands the FFA's restrictions
on transporting, shipping, and receiving firearms through interstate
channels. 62 By prohibiting unlicensed persons from dealing in fire
arms (even to same-state residents) and from manufacturing fire
arms, Congress expanded the FFA's restrictions into intrastate
activities. 63 When the Omnibus Act was passed in 1968, intrastate
activities, such as manufacturing, were beyond the reach of the
Commerce Clause unless they had such a "close and substantial re
lation to interstate commerce that their control [was] essential or
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens or obstructions
"64

The Senate never considered in its report on the Omnibus Act
whether manufacturing or dealing firearms to same-state residents
58. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit.
IV, sec. 928, § 906, 82 Stat. 197, 234 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.c. §§ 921-30 (2000)).
59. §§ 921-28, 82 Stat. at 226-35.
60. S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 19-20 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,
2197-99.
61. § 922(a)(I), 82 Stat. at 228.
62. Federal Firearms Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 785, §2(a), (b), 52 Stat. 1250 (1938)
(repealed 1968).
63. Manufacturing is an intrastate activity. "[T]hat which does not belong to
commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police power of the State.... Commerce
succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it." United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. 1, 12 (1895).
64. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). The current
constitutional standard for determining whether the Commerce Clause reaches an in
trastate activity is whether that activity "substantially affects" interstate commerce.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
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had a "close and substantial relation" to interstate commerce. 65
When the Senate mentioned Congress's commerce power justifica
tion for the Omnibus Act, it was solely in terms of making it easier
for the states to exercise their police powers:
[T]he existing Federal controls over [interstate and foreign traffic
in firearms] do not adequately enable the States to control this
traffic within their own borders through the exercise of their po
lice power .... only through adequate Federal control over inter
state and foreign commerce in these weapons, and over all
persons engaging in the businesses of importing, manufacturing,
or dealing in them can this grave problem [of dangerous people
obtaining firearms] be properly dealt with, and effective State
and local regulation of this traffic be made possible ....66
Likewise, the House of Representatives reported that the pur
pose of H.R. 5037, whose provisions would later become part of the
Omnibus Act, was to provide federal money to help state and local
governments address lawlessness more effectively: "H.R. 5037 is
the heart of President Johnson's national strategy against crime."67
The Omnibus Act itself states that the Act's purpose is "[t]o pre
vent crime and to insure the greater safety of the people" and that
Congress finds that "crime is essentially a local problem that must
be dealt with by State and local governments ...."68
When Congress passed the Omnibus Act it used the commerce
power to encroach on the intrastate activities of manufacturing and
of dealing firearms to same-state residents, but did not consider
whether such activities met the constitutional "close and substantial
relation" standard articulated in NLRB v. Jones. 69 The Omnibus
Act also encroaches on the intrastate activity of possession, by mak
ing it unlawful for several categories of people to possess a fire
arm.7° These categories include convicted felons, dishonorably
discharged members of the armed forces, mental incompetents, for
mer American citizens who have renounced their citizenship, and
illegal aliens.7 1 The Act also forbids "[ a]ny individual who to his
65. S.
66. S.

REP.
REP.

No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112.
No. 90-1097, at 19 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2113

14.
67. H.R. REP. No. 90-488, at 7 (1967).
68. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit.
1,82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.c. §§ 921-30 (2000».
69. Jones, 301 U.S. at 37.
70. § 1202(a), (b), 82 Stat. 197 at 236-37.
71. § 1202(a), 82 Stat. 197 at 236.
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knowledge and while being employed" by any person in these cate
gories to possess a firearm "in the course of such employment."72
The Omnibus Act does state that Congress found that such posses
sion of a firearm, which is clearly an intrastate activity, is a "burden
on commerce or threat affecting the free flow of commerce .... "73
Remarkably, however, there is nothing in the legislative history
of the Omnibus Act that indicates that Congress ever considered
whether firearms possession affects commerce. The Omnibus Act
also states that Congress found that firearms possession by individ
uals within these categories constitutes a "threat to the exercise of
free speech and the free exercise of a religion . . . ."74 There is
nothing in the legislative history that addresses, let alone supports
these findings, either.
The Senate reported that the purpose of the Omnibus Act was
to combat crime, not to restrict law-abiding citizens from possessing
firearms for lawful purposes, or to "discourage or eliminate the pri
vate ownership" of firearms by such citizensJ5 It stands to reason
then, that since there are far fewer individuals in the restricted cate
gories than there are law-abiding citizens, that Congress was never
concerned that the mere possession of firearms by persons within
the restricted categories had any kind of deleterious effect on inter
state commerce or on the free exercise of speech and religion. It
appears, from the legislative history, that individuals such as con
victed felons and illegal aliens were prohibited from possessing fire
arms solely as a means of reducing crime, and not as a protection
for interstate commerce.
D.

The Gun Control Act of 1968 Does Not Prohibit Firearms
Possession

Later in the same year, Congress passed the Gun Control Act
of 1968 (GCA)J6 Like the Omnibus Act, the GCA was passed
under the commerce power.77 Congress did consider the constitu
72. § 1202(b), 82 Stat. 197 at 236-37.
73. § 1201(1), 82 Stat. 197 at 236.
74. § 1201(3), 82 Stat. 197 at 236.
75. S. REp. No. 90-1097, at 20 (1968), reprinted in 1968 u.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2114.
76. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (codified at
18 u.s.c. §§ 921-30 (2000».
77. The GCA states that its purpose is to "provide for better control of the inter
state traffic in firearms." 82 Stat. at 1213. The House of Representatives reported that
the GCA's "principal purpose" was to "strengthen Federal controls over interstate and
foreign commerce in firearms and to assist the States effectively to regulate firearms
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tionality of outlawing firearms possession,78 just as it did before
passing the NFA.7 9 However, Congress learned once again that it
had no constitutional authority to prohibit such possession. 8o When
a proposal to prohibit all persons younger than twenty-one from
possessing firearms was made during a GCA congressional hearing,
General Counsel of the Treasury Fred B. Smith responded, "It
seems doubtful that the . . . provision can be justified under the
taxing or commerce powers, or under any other power enumerated
in the Constitution ...."81 Smith added that although the Treasury
Department opposed "in principle, the possession of [NFA] fire
arms by persons of immature years" it favored accomplishing this
goal by prohibiting licensed dealers from selling firearms to anyone
underage. 82
The GCA does not prohibit possession of a firearm by any cat
egory of persons. Furthermore, the GCA states that it does not
have the purpose of restricting law-abiding citizens from possessing
firearms for lawful purposes. 83 However, it expands the list of cate
gories of persons subject to certain federal firearms restrictions by
prohibiting persons addicted to illegal drugs and those who have
been committed to mental institutions from shipping or transport
ing "any firearm ... in interstate or foreign commerce" and from
receiving "any firearm ... which has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce."84
Only a few months earlier, Congress had prohibited several
categories of dangerous persons from possessing firearms under the
Omnibus Act8S by claiming to have made findings concerning inter
state commerce. 86 It is therefore reasonable to ask why Congress
did not also prohibit the new GCA categories of dangerous persons
subject to federal firearms restrictions from possessing firearms.
There is no evidence that Congress considered whether the
traffic within their borders." H.R. REP. No. 90-1577, at 6 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4411.
78. See generally Federal Firearms Act: Hearings on S. 1, S. 1853, and S. 1854
Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the S. Comm. on the Judici
ary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter 1967 Senate Firearms Hearings].
79. 1934 House Firearms Hearings, supra note 18, at 100.
80. 1967 Senate Firearms Hearings at 1089.
81. Id. at 1088-89 (statement of Fred B. Smith, General Counsel of the Treasury).
82. Id. at 1089 (statement of Fred B. Smith, General Counsel of the Treasury).
83. § 101, 82 Stat. at 1213-14.
84. § 922(g), (h), 82 Stat. at 1220-21.
85. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit.
VII, § 1202(a), (b), 82 Stat. 197,236-37 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.c. §§ 921-30 (2000».
86. § 1201(1), 82 Stat. 197 at 236.
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new GCA categories were likely to have a less substantial effect on
interstate commerce by possessing firearms than the Omnibus Act
categories were likely to have. As demonstrated earlier, there is
also nothing in the Omnibus Act's legislative history that supports
Congress's claim that firearms possession by persons in these cate
gories affects interstate commerce. It is logical to assume, then,
that Congress could have found that firearms possession by persons
in the GCA categories affected interstate commerce despite there
being no legislative history to support such findings. It is not likely
that Congress's failure to do so was an oversight, because the only
difference in restrictions between the two categories is that the
GCA categories are not prohibited from possessing firearms.87
It is also not likely that political considerations account for this
difference. There is no indication in the GCA's legislative history
that Congress was under pressure from any groups advocating that
mental patients and persons addicted to illegal drugs should possess
firearms. The GCA does state clearly that its purpose is not to re
strict law-abiding citizens from possessing firearms,88 which may
have been due to political pressure from gun owner groups. How
ever, illegal drug addicts are not law-abiding citizens by definition,
and do not form the constituency of such groups.
However, before passing the GCA, Congress considered the
constitutionality of prohibiting firearms possession,89 something it
did not consider before passing the Omnibus Act. Congress ascer
tained that it had no power to prohibit firearms possession. 90
Given the prohibition on firearms possession in the Omnibus Act, it
is likely that if Congress believed it had constitutional authority to
prohibit these new categories of dangerous persons from possessing
firearms, it would have done so.
E.

The Firearms Owners' Protection Act and the Scarce
Legislative History Behind § 922(0)

The most recent federal gun control legislation is the Firearms
Owners' Protection Act (FOPA), which includes 18 V.S.c.
87. Compare tit. IV, § 922 (a)(1), 82 Stat. at 228 and tit. VII, § 1202(a), (b), 82
Stat. 197 at 236-37 with Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, Tit. I, § 922(g),
(h), 82 Stat. 1213, 1220-21 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.c. §§ 921-30 (2000)).
88. § 101, 82 Stat. at 1213-14.
89. 1967 Senate Firearms Hearings at 1089.
90. [d. at 1088-89.
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§ 922(0).91 Congress passed the FOPA because Congress found

that the "rights of citizens" under the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth,
and Tenth Amendments required "additional legislation to correct
existing firearms statutes and enforcement policies. "92 Congress
also found that "additional legislation [was] required to reaffirm the
intent of the Congress, as expressed in section 101 of the Gun Con
trol Act of 1968."93 The FOPA quotes this congressional intent
from section 101 of the Gun Control Act of 1968: "[I]t is not the
purpose of this title to place any undue or unnecessary Federal re
strictions or burdens on law-abiding citizens with respect to the ...
possession, or use of firearms appropriate to the purpose of ... any
.. .... "94
. .. I awf uI activIty
The FOPA does, however, amend 18 U.S.c. § 922(g), which
codifies both section 1202 of the Omnibus Act and section 922(g),
(h) of the GCA, to expand the categories of persons who may not
possess firearms "in or affecting commerce."95 The FOPA also
amends 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) to forbid "any individual, who to that
individual's knowledge and while being employed by any person
described in any paragraph of subsection (g) of this section, in the
course of such employment" to possess a firearm "in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce."96 The entire list of categories of
persons now prohibited by 18 U.S.c. § 922(g) from possessing a
firearm "in or affecting commerce" comprises felons, fugitives from
justice, persons who use or who are addicted to illegal drugs, mental
defectives, persons who have been committed to mental institu
tions, illegal aliens, persons who have been dishonorably discharged
from the armed services, persons who have renounced their U.S.
citizenship, and persons under restraining orders for violent behav
Ior or who have been convicted of domestic violence
misdemeanors. 97
However, the FOPA's prohibition on machine gun possession
reaches beyond these categories to affect all law-abiding citizens.
The FOPA amends 18 U.S.c. § 922 by adding subsection (0), which
91. Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99·308, § 102(9), 100 Stat. 449,
452-53 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.c. §§ 921-29 (2000».
92. § l(b)(l), 100 Stat. at 449.
93. § 1(b)(2), 100 Stat. at 449.
94. § 1(b)(2), 100 Stat. at 449 (quoting Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90
618, tit. I, § 101,82 Stat. 1213, 1213-14 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 921
30 (2000».
95. § 102(6), 100 Stat. at 452.
96. § 102(7), 100 Stat. at 452.
97. 18 U.S.c. § 922(g) (2000).
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makes it unlawful for "any person to transfer or possess a
machinegun" unless such possession is under the authority of the
United States or a state or the machine gun was lawfully possessed
before May 19, 1986. 98
Very little legislative history concerns § 922(0), which was a
last-minute amendment that was not referred to in any House hear
ings or reports. 99 One piece of this scarce history appears in a
House report that mentions an earlier, rejected bill which would
have prohibited the possession of machine guns used by "racketeers
and drug traffickers" for criminal purposes, but would have permit
ted those who possessed "lawfully registered machine guns" to con
tinue possessing them.IOO The only reference in the legislative
history concerning the House vote on § 922(0) is that of Represen
tative William J. Hughes, a New Jersey Democrat who sponsored
§ 922(0), and who asked for "an opportunity to explain why ma
chine guns should be banned" when there were only three minutes
of discussion left before a vote was to be taken on the FOPA bil1. 101
Over the objection of Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
a Wisconsin Republican, and while the Clerk continued reading the
amendment, Hughes declared, "I do not know why anyone would
object to the banning of machine guns. "102
There was also little Senate discussion of § 922(0). A colloquy
between Kansas Senator Robert J. Dole and Utah Senator Orrin G.
Hatch, who were both Republican proponents103 of the FOPA, con
cerned machine gun possession.104 The senators stated that the
amendment which was to become § 922(0) would not prohibit per
sons or manufacturers who possessed machine guns prior to the
FOPA's enactment from continuing to possess and transfer those
machine guns. !Os Furthermore, manufacturers would not be pro
hibited from possessing machine gun parts which had not been as
sembled before the date of the FOPA's enactment.1°6 The senators
98. § 102(9), 100 Stat. at 452-53 (emphasis added).
99. 132 CONGo REC. S9601 (1986); see also David T. Hardy, The Firearms Own
ers' Protection Act: A Historical and Legal Perspective, 17 CUMBo L. REV. 585, 670-71
(1987) (discussing § 922(0)'s scant legislative history).
100. H.R. REp. No. 99-495, at 4 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327,
1330.
101. 132 CONGo REc. H7085 (1986) (statement of Rep. Hughes).
102. Id. (statement of Rep. Hughes).
103. 132 CONGo REC. S9601 (1986).
104. Id. at S9599-601.
105. Id. at S9599-600.
106. Id.
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also said that the amendment would not prohibit manufacturers
who sought to sell machine guns to police, military, or defense con
tractors from continuing to possess machine guns. 107 However,
neither senator discussed whether machine gun possession had any
effect on interstate commerce.
Other senators expressed doubt concerning Dole and Hatch's
interpretation of the amendment. Senator Howard M. Metzen
baum, an Ohio Democrat, remarked that colloquies often "provide
interpretations that were not originally intended" and wanted it on
record that Dole and Hatch's colloquy was "not to serve any pur
pose as to changing the intent or the purpose or any aspect whatso
ever of the legislation."108 Senator Edward M. Kennedy, a
Massachusetts Democrat, stated in a colloquy with Metzenbaum
that his understanding of the House's intent concerning the amend
ment was to prohibit manufacturers from possessing machine gun
parts which had not yet been assembled by the date of the FOPA's
enactment.1 09 Neither Metzenbaum nor Kennedy discussed
whether machine gun possession had any effect on interstate
commerce.110
The FOPA marks the first time in the history of federal gun
control legislation that Congress outlawed almost all persons, in al
most all circumstances, from merely possessing a particular kind of
firearm. As is clear from the almost nonexistent legislative history
concerning § 922(0), none of which addresses the effect of machine
gun possession on interstate commerce, § 922(0) was passed with
out any substantial congressional investigation as to whether
§ 922(0) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.
In summary, no federal gun control legislation's legislative his
tory supports a finding that machine gun possession affects inter
state commerce and therefore may be regulated under the
commerce power. The National Firearms Act of 1934 used the tax
ing power, not the commerce power, to prohibit firearms posses
sion,111 and restricted this prohibition to firearms obtained from
illegal transfersp2 The Federal Firearms Act of 1938 did not pro
107. Id. at S9600.
108. /d. at S9601 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
109. Id. at S9602.
110. Congress, however, did conclude that firearms possession affects the na
tional economy. This conclusion is discussed infra Part II. A.
111. 1934 House Firearms Hearings at 86.
112. Sonzinsky v. United States, 86 F.2d 486, 488-89 (7th Cir. 1936) (holding that
the appellant could not be convicted of possessing a firearm without proof that he pos
sessed the firearm as a result of an illegal transfer).
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hibit firearms possession; it merely made firearms possession by
certain categories of dangerous persons, or possession of a firearm
without a manufacturer's serial number, presumptive evidence of
fl"A. violations.1 13 The statement in the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, that the possession of firearms by cer
tain categories of dangerous persons burdens commerce and threat
ens free speech and religion, is dubious because no mention of
these findings occurs anywhere in the Omnibus Act's legislative his
tory.114 The Gun Control Act of 1968 does not prohibit firearms
possession.11 5 Section 102(9). of the Firearms Owners' Protection
Act prohibits machine gun possession,116 but its scarce legislative
history does not address the effect of machine gun possession on
interstate commerce.
There is reason to ask, then, whether 18 U.S.c. § 922(0)(1) is a
constitutional exercise of Congress's commerce power.
II.
A.

Is 18 U.S.c. § 922(0)(1) CONSTITUTIONAL?

Pre-Lopez Court Challenges to § 922(0)(1)

The first case to challenge 18 U.S.c. § 922(0)(1) as an uncon
stitutional use of Congress's commerce power was United States v.
Evans, decided by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
1991. 117 Creed Miles Evans was indicted in the United States Dis
trict Court for the District of Montana on charges of conspiracy and
of aiding and abetting related to the possession of machine guns in
violation of § 922(0).118 Although the indictment relating to
§ 922(0) was dismissed in exchange for Evans's guilty plea to an
other charge,119 the question whether § 922(0) is constitutional was
considered on appeal. 120
113. Federal Firearms Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 785, § 2(f), (i), 52 Stat. 1250,1251
(1938) (repealed 1968).
114. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit.
VII, § 1201(1), (3), 82 Stat. 197,236 (1968).
115. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (codified
at 18 U.S.c. §§ 921-30 (2000», supra Part I. D.
116. Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, §102(9), 100 Stat. 449,
452-53 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.c. § 922(0) (2000».
117. United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1991), abrogated by United
States v. Edwards, 55 F.3d 428 (9th Cir. 1995). The Edwards court abrogated Evans in
light of the US. Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 559 (1995)
that 18 U.S.c. § 922(q) is unconstitutional. Edwards, 55 F.3d at 428. Lopez is taken up
infra Part II. B.
118. Evans, 928 F.2d at 858-59.
119. Id. at 860.
120. Id. at 862.
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The court held that because Congress had found that "at least
750,000 people had been killed in the United States by firearms"
between 1900 and 1986 (the date of the FOPA's enactment), it was
"reasonable for Congress to conclude that the possession of fire
arms affects the national economy, if only through the insurance
industry."121
However, § 922(0)(1) prohibits the possession of machine
guns, not firearms in general. 122 The court overstated its argument
when it applied the number of deaths attributed to firearms in gen
eral to those attributed to machine guns in particular. In fact, the
following evidence tends to support that for many decades now,
very little violent crime has been associated with machine guns.
Stephen E. Higgins, the director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms, was asked during a congressional hearing, in a letter
dated May 16, 1984 from Representative William J. Hughes, the
chairman of the House Subcommittee on Crime, about what Hig
gins had characterized in an earlier letter to Hughes as the "law
enforcement aspects of the commerce in machine guns .... "123 Hig
gins responded to Hughes's questions:
#16. Q. The number of criminal cases involving all types of ma
chineguns, and the number of criminal cases involving registered
machineguns.
A. A total of 707 machine guns were acquired by ATF dur
ing FY-83. Most of the Federal firearms violations involved in
these acquisitions are for illegal making or possession of unregis
tered firearms.
Registered machineguns which are involved in crimes are so
minimal so as not to be considered a law enforcement
problem.....
#17. Q. The number of thefts of NFA weapons.
A. While actual statistics are not available, the number of
thefts of registered NFA weapons are minimal and is not consid
ered a law enforcement problem. 124

There are only four state and federal appellate cases concern
ing machine gun murders that occurred between 1944 and 1991,
121. Id.
122. 18 U.S.c. § 922(0)(1) (2000).
123. Armor Piercing Ammunition and the Criminal Misuse and Availability of
Machineguns and Silencers: Hearings on H.R. 641 and Related Bills Before the Sub
comm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Congo 195 (1986) [hereinaf
ter 1984 House Machineguns Hearings J.
124. Id. at 208 (questions of Rep. Hughes and answers of Dir. Higgins).
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when the court decided Evans .125 This dearth of cases suggests a
dearth of machine gun murders.
The Evans court did recognize that the connection it asserted
between machine gun possession and interstate commerce was a
"rather tenuous nexus" but held that nexus to be sufficient, citing
the Supreme Court's ruling in Heart ofAtlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States that hotels that practice racial discrimination affect interstate
commerce. 126 In Heart of Atlanta Motel, however, the Court did
not hold that racial discrimination at hotels had a merely tenuous
connection to interstate commerce. To the contrary, the Court as
serted that Congress may only exercise its commerce power to reg
ulate interstate activities that have a "real and substantial relation
to the national interest."127 It also held that Congress may use the
commerce power to "regulate discriminatory practices now found
substantially to effect interstate commerce."128 Furthermore, in
Maryland v. Wirtz, the Court noted that it has never ruled that
"Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an
excuse for broad general regulation of state or private activities. "129
The Evans court's holding that the commerce power reaches
activities that have a tenuous connection to interstate commerce is
not supported by either Heart of Atlanta Motel or Wirtz. Although
the court found that it was "reasonable for Congress to conclude
that the possession of firearms affects the national economy, if only
through the insurance industry,"130 the court based this finding on
Congress's finding that 750,000 people had been killed by firearms
between 1900 and 1986.131 The court's reasoning was not based on
125. Evans v. State, 855 A.2d 291, 292-94 (Md. 2004) (concerning an appellant
who was convicted of using a machine gun to murder two narcotics witnesses in 1983);
Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 284-85 (6th Cir. 1994) (concerning an off-duty
police officer who pled guilty to murdering a suspected drug dealer with a registered
machine gun in 1988); People v. Silva, 754 P.2d 1070, 1075-76 (Cal. 1988) (concerning a
defendant who was convicted of murdering a kidnap victim with a machine gun in
1981); State v. Holloway 195 S.W.2d 662, 663-64 (Mo. 1946) (concerning a jail inmate
who murdered a sheriff with a machine gun while attempting to help the appellant,
another inmate, to escape in 1944).
126. Evans, 928 F.2d at 862 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964».
127. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 255.
128. Id. at 252 (emphasis added).
129. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196-97 n.27 (1968), overruled on other
grounds by Nat'l League of Cities v. Usey, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (ruling that Congress
may not use the commerce power to force states to choose how to conduct important
governmental functions).
130. Evans, 928 F.2d at 862.
131. Id.
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the actual number of people killed in crimes involving machine
guns in particular but on the number of people killed in crimes in
volving firearms in general. Therefore, the Evans court's holding
that § 922(0) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause lacks
both legal and factual support.
The next case that raised commerce power challenges to
§ 922(0) was United States v. Hale, which was decided in 1992.132
Wilbur Hale was convicted in the United States District Court,
Eastern District of Arkansas, of possessing machine guns in viola
tion of § 922(0).133 He argued on appeal that § 922(0) "assert[s] no
nexus with interstate commerce" and is therefore an unconstitu
tional use of Congress's commerce power.1 34 The Hale court began
its analysis by quoting from the Supreme Court's ruling in Perez v.
United States: "Where the class of activities is regulated, and that
class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power
to 'excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class."135
However, the Hale court failed to address the fact that the only
class of activities being regulated under § 922(0)(1) is machine gun
transfer and possession. Machine gun possession is not an "individ
ual instance" of a larger class of regulated activities, it is the class of
regulated activities. Although machine guns themselves certainly
fall within the larger class of firearms in general, Congress has
never, in the entire history of gun control legislation, prohibited
nearly all law-abiding citizens from merely possessing firearms.
Therefore, prohibiting nearly all machine gun possession exceeds
the kinds of regulation that has been placed on firearms as a class.
In short, because § 922(0)(1)'s prohibition on machine gun posses
sion is not an "individual instance" of a larger class of activities, the
Hale court improperly applied Perez.
The Hale court then stated that "[t]he legislative history of sec
tion 922(0) indicates that Congress considered the relationship be
tween the availability of machine guns, violent crime, and narcotics
trafficking. "136 However, the legislative history of § 922(0) consid
ers no such relationship. In fact, as demonstrated earlier, the legis
lative history of § 922(0) barely exists. The court offers support for
its statement by citing to H.R. REP. No. 495, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1016-17.
Id. at 1017-18.
Id. at 1018 (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971)).
Id.
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1-5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1327-31.137 However, this
report neither refers to § 922(0), nor to the availability of machine
guns. It does refer to an earlier, rejected bill that would have pro
hibited "possession of machine guns, used by racketeers and drug
traffickers for intimidation, murder and protection of drugs and the
proceeds of crime."138 However, this statement says nothing about
machine gun availability, and is dubious in light of Higgins's state
ment: "Most of the Federal firearms violations involved in these
acquisitions [of 707 machine guns in 1983] are for illegal making or
possession of unregistered firearms. "139
The Hale court then stated that § 922(0) was passed under the
FOPA as an amendment to the Omnibus Act, and that when Con
gress enacted the Omnibus Act, it had "found facts indicating a
nexus between the regulation of firearms and the commerce
power" and that those findings had not changed. 140 The Hale court
said that it agreed with the Evans court that § 922(0) is within Con
gress's commerce power.1 41
The Hale court made the same error of reasoning as the Evans
court in that the Hale court failed to distinguish between firearms
in general and machine guns in particular. As demonstrated earlier,
§ 922(0)(1) has almost no legislative history and there are no find
ings concerning a nexus between interstate commerce and the pro
hibition of machine gun possession, even though machine guns are
the only firearms whose possession Congress almost completely
prohibited. 142 Also, the court treated the unique prohibited status
of machine guns as if that status fell under a larger class of activi
ties,143 even though the prohibition on machine gun possession ex
ceeds the extent of the regulations on all other firearms.144 The
137. Id.
138. H.R. REP. No. 99-495, at 4 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327,
1330.
139. 1984 House Machineguns Hearings, supra note 124.
140. Hale, 978 F.2d at 1018 (citing Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 225 (1968) and Firearms Owner's Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449, 451-53 (1986».
141. Id. (citing United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858,862 (9th Cir. 1991».
142. 18 U.s.c. § 922(0)(1) (2000).
143. Hale, 978 F.2d at 1018.
144. 18 U.S.c. § 922(0)(1) is the only federal gun control statute that prohibits
nearly all law-abiding citizens from merely possessing a particular type of firearm. See
National Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 474, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (superseded by the Inter
nal Revenue Code of 1939; codified as ch. 53 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954;
codified as amended at 1.R.c. § 5801-72 (2003»; Federal Firearms Act of 1938, Pub. L.
No. 785, 52 Stat. 1250 (1938) (repealed 1968); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
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court therefore misapplied Perez, which pertains specifically to
smaller instances of larger classes of activities. 145 The Hale court's
holding that § 922 (0) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause
appears to lack factual, historical, and legal support.
B.

United States v. Lopez

The Supreme Court's 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez
changed previous standards for determining whether the Com
merce Clause reaches an intrastate activity, such as firearms posses
sion. 146 Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), it was "unlawful for any
individual knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in or that
otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the
individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone."147 Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a high school student, was convicted
in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas
of knowingly possessing a firearm (a handgun) in a school zone in
violation of § 922(q).148 Lopez appealed his conviction, arguing
that § 922(q) exceeded Congress's commerce power. 149 The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with Lopez's argument and
reversed his conviction. 150 The government then appealed. 151
The Supreme Court considered the commerce power's history,
starting with the "first principles" embedded in the Constitution
and continuing with a discussion of earlier, landmark Commerce
Clause cases. 152 The Court then determined that there are "three
broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its
commerce power."153 The first category of activity is the "use of
the channels of interstate commerce."154 The second category is
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.c. §§ 921-30
(2000)); Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (codified at
18 U.S.c. §§ 921-30 (2000)); Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308,
§ 102(9), 100 Stat. 449 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.c. §§ 921-28 (2000)).
145. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971). The Court found that intra
state loan sharking activities are smaller instances of a larger class of organized crime
activities that affect interstate commerce, and may therefore be regulated under the
Commerce Clause. Id. at 146 et seq.
146. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
147. 18 U.S.c. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000).
148. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549, 551-52.
149. Id. at 552.
150. Id. at 549, 552; United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993).
151. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549, 552.
152. Id. at 552-58.
153. Id. at 558.
154. Id.
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"instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities. "155 The third category is "those activities hav
ing a substantial relation to interstate commerce."156 The Court
then ruled that an activity within this third category only falls under
the commerce power if the activity" 'substantially affects' interstate
commerce. "157
The Court decided that because § 922(q) does not regulate
channels, instrumentalities, persons, or things in interstate com
merce, § 922(q) should be considered under the third category, and
so the" 'substantially affects' interstate commerce" test must be ap
plied. 158 In applying this test, the Court noted that § 922(q) "is a
criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'com
merce."'159 The Court also noted that § 922(q) "is not an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regula
tory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated."160 Furthermore, § 922(q) "has no express jurisdictional
element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm pos
sessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect
on interstate commerce. "161 The Court found § 922( q) unconstitu
tional, holding that the "possession of a gun in a local school zone is
in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition else
where, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce."162
Section 922( q) prohibited mere possession of any firearms in a
defined area (a school zone).1 63 Section 922(0)(1) prohibits almost
all persons anywhere from merely possessing a particular kind of
firearm (a machine gun).164 It is, therefore, reasonable to apply the
Lopez court's analysis of § 922(q) to § 922(0)(1). That is exactly
what appellants and courts have been doing since Lopez was
decided.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 558-59.
157. Id. at 559.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 561. The government argued that "possession of a firearm in a school
zone may result in violent crime and that violent crime [may] be expected to affect the
functioning of the national economy in two ways." Id. at 563. One of those ways was
insurance costs. Id. at 563-64. The other way was by "threatening the learning environ
ment" and thereby producing "a less productive citizenry." Id. at 564.
160. Id. at 561.
161. Id. at 562.
162. Id. at 567.
163. 18 U.S.c. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000).
164. 18 U.S.c. § 922(0)(1) (2000).
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Post-Lopez Court Challenges to § 922(0)1

Since 1995, every appellate court that has ruled on Commerce
Clause challenges to § 922(0) has grappled with Lopez.165 The first
of these cases was United States v. Wilks. 166 Larry Francis Wilks
operated a gun shop, from which he sold three machine guns to
undercover agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fire
arms (BATF).167 BATF agents also found two machine guns while
searching Wilks's home. 168 Wilks was charged under 18 U.S.c.
§ 922(0) with illegal transfer and possession of a machine gun. 169
Wilks claimed that 18 U.S. C. § 922(0) was unconstitutional and
filed a motion to dismiss the indictment in the United States Dis
trict Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma.17° After the dis
trict court denied Wilks's motion, Wilks entered conditional pleas
of guilty to the possession counts.1 71 He then appealed to the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, arguing that 18 U.S.c. § 922(0)
"asserts no nexus with interstate commerce, and is thus beyond the
constitutional power granted to Congress to regulate commerce."172
The Wilks court distinguished § 922(0) from § 922(q) by exam
ining the former under the second category of activity that the Lo
pez Court said could be regulated under the Commerce Clause,
that of "things in interstate commerce."173 Noting that the Lopez
Court had determined that § 922(q) was a break with earlier federal
firearms legislation,174 the Wilks court further distinguished
§ 922(0) as "consistent with this earlier federal legislation because it
merely regulates the movement of a particular firearm in interstate
165.

United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1134-35, 1137-41 (9th Cir. 2003),

vacated and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265,
1268-70 (11th Cir. 1997), rehearing granted in part, opinion vacated in irrelevant part;
sentence affd, 133 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Knutson, 113 F.3d 27, 28

30 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 276-79, 281-85 (3d Cir. 1996);
United States v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781, 782-84, 786-87 (6th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 886-90 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948,
951-52 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791, 795-97 (5th Cir. 1995), rehear
ing en bane granted, 78 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1996), and on rehearing en bane, 105 F.3d 997
(5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1995).
166. Wilks, 58 F.3d at 1518.
167. [d. at 1519.
168. [d.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
[d.
[d.
[d.
Id.
[d.

at 1518-19.
at 1519.
at 1521 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995».
at 1521 n.4 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563).
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commerce."175 The Wilks court rested its distinction on the Lopez
Court's finding that § 922( q) went beyond the Commerce Clause's
reach to regulate a "purely intrastate" activity,176 holding that
§ 922(0) sought to reach an interstate commerce activity by regulat
ing the machine gun market by prohibiting possession.177
However, this distinction weakens under the Wilks court's dis
cussion of machine guns as national commodities. The Wilks court
began this discussion by distinguishing the Lopez Court's analysis
that § 992( q) "sought to regulate an activity [firearms possession in
school zones] which by its nature was purely intrastate and could
not substantially affect commerce even when incidents of those ac
tivities were aggregated together."178 The Wilks court then de
cided, based on a statement made by the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, in United States v.
Hunter, that machine guns "by their nature are 'a commodity ...
transferred across state lines for profit by business entities."'179
According to the Wilks court, a handgun like that possessed by
Lopez is not "by its nature" a commodity transferred in interstate
commerce, but a machine gun is. Given that both products are sold
across state lines, nothing in the Wilks decision explains why the
court agreed with Lopez that handgun possession is essentially in
trastate but then decided that machine gun possession is not. The
only support the Wilks court provides for considering machine guns
to be "by their nature" commodities in interstate commerce is the
Hunter court's statement that there is a "definitively national mar
ket for machineguns" (alteration in original).180 However, the
Hunter court's statement is based on allegations in the indictments
against the defendants in Hunter,181 not on any significant investi
gation into whether machine gun possession substantially affects in
terstate commerce. However, the act of machine gun possession is
not a "thing[] in interstate commerce" and so cannot fall under the
second Lopez category.182
The Wilks court then decreed, based on its contention that ma
chine guns, but not handguns, are in their essence things in inter
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1521 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
177. Id.
178. [d. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
179. Id. (quoting United States v. Hunter, 843 F.Supp. 235, 249 (E.D. Mich.
1994)) (alteration in original).
180. [d. (quoting Hunter, 843 F. Supp. at 249).
181. Hunter, 843 F.Supp. at 249.
182. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
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state commerce, that § 922(0) "represents Congressional regulation
of an item bound up with interstate attributes and thus differs in
substantial respect from legislation concerning possession of a fire
arm within a purely local school zone."183
Mere possession of any object, without a transfer, does not
bring that object into commerce. Even if the Wilks court had
demonstrated that machine guns are essentially "things in interstate
commerce," it did not address whether the purely intrastate activity
of machine gun possession falls under any of the categories of
proper Commerce Clause regulation articulated in Lopez. There
fore, the court failed to rule on what § 922(0)(1) actually regulates.
The Wilks court acknowledged that 18 U.S.c. § 922(0) has al
most no legislative history.184 Relying on observations made by the
Hale court, the Wilks court pointed out that Congress had, how
ever, considered the relationship between machine gun availability
and violent crime when it passed the FOPA.185 The Wilks court
noted that Congress had found a "nexus between the regulation of
firearms and the commerce power when it first enacted [§] 922" of
the Omnibus Act. 186 Furthermore, the court stated that § 922(0)
became part of the FOPA as an amendment to § 922 of the Omni
bus Act, and that § 922(0) did not alter any Omnibus Act
findings. 187
However, the Hale court did not distinguish between congres
sional findings related to firearms in general and machine guns in
particular when it discussed the FOPA's legislative history. The
Wilks court therefore relied on an apparent error of reasoning in
the Hale court's ruling.
The Wilks court also relied on the incorrect rationale from
Hunter, quoting: "Thus, although not explicitly stated in the lan
guage of the statute itself, it is evident that Congress prohibited the
transfer and possession of most post-1986 machineguns not merely
to ban these firearms, but rather, to control their interstate move
ment by proscribing transfer or possession."188 The court found
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1519-20.
185. Id. at 1520 (citing United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1018 (8th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 997 (1993».
186. Id. (citing Hale, 978 F.2d at 1018).
187. Id. (citing Hale, 978 F.2d at 1018).
188. Id. at 1522 (quoting United States v. Hunter, 843 F. Supp. 235, 248-49 (E.D.
Mich. 1994».
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§ 922(0) constitutiona1. 189
It is far from evident, however, based on the lack of legislative
history concerning § 922(0) and the lack of Congressional findings

addressing the impact of machine gun possession on interstate com
merce, that Congress ever considered whether machine gun posses
sion affects interstate commerce. The Evans court stated that the
standard of review for determining the "validity of an act that is
said to violate the Commerce Clause ... [is] whether a reasonable
Congress could find that the class of activity regulated affects inter
state commerce. "190 But it is not clear that a reasonable Congress
would have found that machine gun possession affects interstate
commerce. The Evans court only found that a reasonable Congress
could have determined that, based on the high number of people
killed by firearms, "possession of firearms affects the national econ
omy, if only through the insurance industry."191 But this finding is
based on firearms in general, not on the small number of machine
guns in particular.
Therefore, in its reliance on the Hunter court's indictment alle
gation-based assertions that the market for machine guns is defini
tively national, the Wilks court's basis for defining machine guns as
an essentially interstate commodity is exceedingly weak. This weak
ness makes analyzing § 922(0) under Lopez's second category,
"things in interstate commerce,"192 questionable. Analyzing
§ 922(0) as if it prohibited machine guns instead of possession of
machine guns that were not legally possessed prior to May 19, 1986
makes the court's analysis further suspect. Finally, by relying on
the faulty reasoning employed by the Hale court in its discussion of
the FOPA's legislative history, that is, the Hale court's confusion of
firearms in general with machine guns in particular, the Wilks court
perpetuated this error in its own analysis. The Wilks court's hold
ing that § 922(0) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause
rests, therefore, on dubious grounds.
The next case that raised a constitutional challenge to 18
U.S.c. § 922(0) was United States v. Kirk.1 93 From September 1988
through January 4, 1989, William J. Kirk "attempted to sell various
unregistered machineguns" to Donald Mueller, who was cooperat
189. Id.
190. United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 152-56 (1971».
191. Id.
192. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
193. United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1995).
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ing with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. 194 On Janu
ary 4, 1989, Kirk and Mueller went to a rifle range where they
obtained parts to convert a semi-automatic rifle into a machine
gun. 195 They then "test-fired the converted machinegun" and Kirk
sold this machine gun to Mueller,196 On February 21, 1989, Kirk
and Mueller met at the same rifle range, where Kirk sold Mueller
an UZI carbine that had been converted into a machine gun. 197
Kirk was charged with unlawful possession and transfer of a ma
chine gun in violation of 18 U.S.c. § 922(0).198 Kirk filed a motion
to dismiss the indictment in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas, arguing that 18 U.S.c. § 922(0) "ex
ceeded the power of the federal government under the Commerce
Clause."199 After the district court denied his motion, Kirk entered
a conditional guilty plea and appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit.2OO
The Kirk court began its analysis by misreading § 922(0):
"When read as a whole, it is plain that the activities [transfer or
possession of a machine gun] prohibited by section 922(0) consti
tute commerce."201 But as Circuit Judge Edith H. Jones pointed
out in her dissent, the majority made a "fundamental mistake by ...
their misconstruction of the plain language of the statute."202 Jones
noted that because the language of § 922(0) employs the disjunc
tive, "possession alone is criminalized independent of any transfer
of a machine gun."203 This means that the statute does not limit its
prohibition to acts of possession that affect interstate commerce,
"[r]ather, it criminalizes the mere private possession of a machine
gun."204
Nevertheless, the majority decided that because § 922(0) only
prohibits the possession of machine guns that were not legally pos
sessed before May 19, 1986, "there could be no unlawful possession
under section 922(0) without an unlawful transfer."205 The court
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 792.

at 793.
at 792-93.
at 796.
at 799 (Jones, J., dissenting).

at 796 (majority opinion).
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then reasoned that "the ban on such possession is an attempt to
control the interstate market for machine guns by creating criminal
liability for those who would constitute the demand side of the mar
ket, i.e., those who would facilitate illegal transfer out of the desire
to acquire mere possession."206
There is a twofold problem with this reasoning. First, as the
Sonzinsky court held in 1936, mere possession of a firearm is not
proof that the firearm was illegally transferred. 207 Absent proof of
an illegal transfer, Sonzinsky could not be convicted under the NFA
of illegally possessing a firearm.208 Second, as the case of United
States v. Stewart would later demonstrate, it is possible for a person
to possess machine guns that were neither lawfully possessed before
May 19, 1986, the date that § 922(0)(1) became effective,209 nor un
lawfully transferred.2 l0 Stewart possessed machine guns he made
himself out of parts; some of those parts moved through interstate
channels but none of Stewart's machine guns did. 211 Therefore,
Judge Jones was proved to be correct, in that transfer and posses
sion are wholly independent acts under § 922(0)(1), and that
§ 922(0)(1) prohibits possession of a machine gun whether or not
that possession has any connection with interstate commerce. 212
An activity that has no connection with interstate commerce is be
yond the reach of the Commerce Clause, because it does not fall
within any of the three categories of activity that Congress can reg
ulate that the Court articulated in Lopez. 213
Based on its reasoning that unlawful possession under § 922(0)
cannot occur absent an unlawful transfer, the Kirk court deter
mined that § 922(0) should be analyzed under the first category of
activities that the Supreme Court held in Lopez fell under the
Commerce Clause, that of the "use of the channels of interstate
commerce."214 The Kirk court then concluded that "even though,
admittedly, some of the activity made unlawful is purely intrastate,"
206. Id.
207. Sonzinsky v. United States, 86 F.2d 486, 488-89 (7th Cir. 1936), affd, 300
U.S. 506 (1937).
208. Id. at 489.
209. 18 U.S.c. § 922(0) (2000).
210. United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated and
remanded, 125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005).
211. Id. at 1135-36.
212. Kirk, 70 F.3d at 799 (Jones, J., dissenting).
213. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
214. Kirk, 70 F.3d at 796-97 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558).
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§ 922(0) is constitutional.215
It is important to note that since Kirk was decided, every ap

peals court (except the Stewart court) that has heard Commerce
Clause challenges to § 922(0) has based its ruling on either repeti
tions or expansions of the flawed reasoning articulated in Hale,
Wilks, and Kirk. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Rambo, which was the first post-Kirk Commerce
Clause challenge to § 922(0), adopted the Kirk court's reasoning. 216
The second post-Kirk Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(0) was
United States v. Kenney, in which the Court of Appeals for the Sev
enth Circuit relied on the legislative history that the Wilks court
relied on from the Hale court, perpetuating the error of applying
congressional findings that related to firearms in general to ma
chine guns in particular. 217 The Kenney court also relied on the
Kirk court's misreading that unlawful possession under § 922(0) re
quires unlawful transfer. 218 The Kenney court did differ from the
rulings in Wilks and Kirk by assigning § 922(0) to the third category
articulated in Lopez, that of activities "having a substantial relation
to interstate commerce."219 Then, without acknowledging Hale, the
Kenney court applied the Hale court's ruling that machine gun pos
session was part of a larger class of regulated activities affecting
commerce. 220 Like the Hale court, it failed to note that
§ 922(0)(1)'s prohibition on machine gun possession exceeds the
regulations placed on firearms as a class, and therefore makes it
problematic to consider the act of possession as part of a larger
class. The four other appeals courts that heard post-Kirk Com
merce Clause challenges to § 922 ( 0) also relied on the errors made
or perpetuated by the earlier courtS.221
The relationship between machine gun possession and inter
state commerce is so uncertain that there has been no consensus
215. Kirk, 70 F.3d at 797.
216. United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948, 951-52 (9th Cir. 1996).
217. United States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1996).
218. Id. at 888-89.
219. !d. at 886, 889-90 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59).
220. !d. at 890.
221. United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that
there is a direct relation between machine gun demand and interstate transfer, but pro
viding no findings or other facts for support); United States v. Knutson, 113 F.3d 27, 30
31 (5th Cir. 1997) (relying on Congressional findings concerning firearms in general, not
machine guns in particular); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 279-82 (3d Cir. 1996)
(relying on Congressional findings concerning firearms in general, not machine guns in
particular); United States v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781, 784-85 (6th Cir. 1996) (relying on
Congressional findings concerning firearms in general, not machine guns in particular).

164

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:133

concerning how to analyze it under Lopez. The first four appeals
courts to hear post-Lopez Commerce Clause challenges to § 922(0)
assigned § 922(0) to three different Lopez categories. 222 The court
in United States v. Beuckelaere considered § 922(0) under all three
categories. 223 The court in United States v. Rybar analyzed § 922(0)
under the third category, and stated that other courts' assignments
of § 922(0) to other categories supported its argument. 224 The
court in United States v. Knutson also analyzed § 922(0) under the
third category, but claimed that the statute likewise "fits comforta
bly" under the first two categories. 225 However, the court in United
States v. Wright rejected the first two categories and held that
§ 922(0) must be analyzed under the third. 226
And that is where the law stood, until the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit decided Stewart. 227
D.

United States v. Stewart: Where We Are Now

In 2003, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit broke from
all earlier appellate decisions concerning whether the Commerce
Clause provides authority for § 922(0) and ruled that § 922(0) is
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause as applied to appel
lant Robert Wilson Stewart. 228 Stewart had created his machine
guns from parts that had moved in interstate channels. 229 The court
described the way Stewart fashioned his machine guns:
[M]any additional parts and tools, as well as expertise and indus
try, were needed to create functioning machineguns. This is
quite different than if Stewart had ordered a disassembled gun
and simply put the parts together, the way one might assemble a
chair from IKEA. These machine guns were a "unique type of
firearm," with legal parts mixed and matched from various ori
gins; they required more than a simple turn of a screw-driver or a
hit of a hammer to become machineguns. We therefore cannot
222. Kenney, 91 F.3d at 889 (assigning § 922(0) to the third category); United
States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948,952 (9th Cir. 1996) (assigning § 922(0) to the first cate
gory); United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791, 796-97 (5th Cir. 1995) (assigning § 922(0) to
the first category); United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir. 1995) (assigning
§ 922(0) to the second category).
223. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d at 784-87.
224. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 283-84.
225. Knutson, 113 F.3d at 29-30.
226. Wright, 117 F.3d at 1270.
227. United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated and re
manded, 125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005).
228. Id. at 1140, 1142.
229. Id. at 1135.
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say that the machine guns themselves-in any recognizable
form-traveled in interstate commerce. 230

Stewart therefore presented the court with the "difficult ques
tion ... where to draw the line between a regulated object and the
matter from which that object was created."231
The Stewart court began its analysis by distinguishing its hold
ing in Rambo, which was based on the Kirk court's holding, that
"there can be 'no unlawful possession under section 922(0) without
an unlawful transfer."'232 The Stewart court found its Rambo hold
ing inapplicable because Stewart did not receive his machine guns
from a transfer; rather, he made the machine guns himself.233
Therefore, the court determined that Stewart did not "use the chan
nels of interstate commerce" to obtain the machine guns, and so his
act of possession did not fall under the first category of Lopez .234
Furthermore, because the machine guns themselves never traveled
in interstate commerce, the court also determined that Stewart's act
of possession did not concern "things in interstate commerce" and
so did not fall under the second category of Lopez .235
The court then turned to the third category of Lopez, that of
"activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce."236
To determine whether Stewart's possession of machine guns had a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, the court applied the
four-prong test set out by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Morrison. 237 The test is:
(1) whether the regulated activity is commercial or economic in
nature;
(2) whether an express jurisdictional element is provided in the
statute to limit its reach;
(3) whether Congress made express findings about the effects of
the proscribed activity on interstate commerce; and
(4) whether the link between the prohibited activity and the ef
fect' on interstate commerce is attenuated [meaning that if the
link is attenuated the activity fails this prongF38
230. Id. at 1136.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1134 (quoting United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir.
1996), quoting United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791, 796 (5th Cir. 1995».
233. Id. at 1135.
234. Id. at 1134-36 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995».
235. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558).
236. Id. at 1134, 1136 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59).
237. Id. at 1136-37 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-12 (2000».
238. Id. (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-12).
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The court held that mere possession of a machine gun is not
economic in nature and so § 922(0) fails the first prong. 239 The
court also held that because there is no evidence that Stewart in
tended to sell or transfer his machine guns, the link between his
possession of machine guns and interstate commerce is "highly at
tenuated" and therefore § 922(0) fails the fourth prong.240 Section
922( 0) contains no jurisdictional element attaching machine gun
possession to interstate commerce and so § 922(0) fails the second
prong. 241 Finally, the court held that because there were no con
gressional findings concerning the effect of machine gun possession
on interstate commerce, § 922(0) fails the third prong.242 The court
concluded that § 922(0), as applied to Stewart, is unconstitu
tiona1. 243
Although the court only struck down § 922(0) on an as-applied
basis given the unique facts of Stewart's case, the court's holding
has wider implications. By recognizing the "limits of Rambo's
logic," that is, by recognizing that § 922(0) does in fact prohibit un
lawful possession absent an unlawful transfer,244 the Stewart court
confirmed Judge Jones's observation that § 922(0) criminalizes pos
session independently of transfer. 245 Therefore, § 922(0) criminal
izes acts of possession that, absent a showing of any "substantial
affect" on interstate commerce, are purely intrastate activities that
are beyond the commerce power's reach. 246 Furthermore, as the
Stewart court states, "nothing in the legislative history of any of the
earlier firearms statutes speaks to the relationship between mere
possession of firearms and interstate commerce."247 Nothing in
§ 922(0 )'s legislative history speaks to this relationship, either, be
cause § 922(0 )'s legislative history is almost nonexistent. There is
therefore no evidence that mere possession of a machine gun has
any affect on interstate commerce, let alone a substantial affect.
Section 922(0) is not merely unconstitutional as applied to
Stewart. It is wholly unconstitutional, and should be struck down.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 1137.
Id.
Id. at 1138.
Id. at 1138-40.
Id. at 1140.
Id. at 1135.
United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791, 799 (5th Cir. 1995) (Jones, J., dissenting).
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1139.
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DOES THE COMMERCE CLAUSE REACH TO MERE

POSSESSION OF SELF-CREATED OBJECTS WHOSE PARTS
MOVED IN INTERSTATE CHANNELS?

Suppose you create objects out of components that you obtain
through interstate channels. Suppose further that none of these
components by itself constitutes your finished product, and that
your product is not merely the end result of assembling these vari
ous components. Like Stewart's machine guns, your self-created
objects require your expertise and industry, your ability to manifest
your vision into a tangible form that nobody else has ever pro
duced. Your product is a unique type of similar products, a type
that never existed before, and would never have existed at all but
for your creativity. Does the Commerce Clause give Congress the
power to prohibit you, under any circumstances, from merely pos
sessing such objects?
The Stewart court's analysis of Stewart's mere possession of
self-created machine guns is a useful guide to this wider issue of
how to analyze the mere possession of any self-created object. 248
The Stewart court applied the categories under which Congress may
exercise its commerce power, as determined by the Supreme Court
in Lopez. 249 The same method of analysis reveals that mere posses
sion of any self-created object cannot fall within the first two Lopez
categories. 250
As to the first category, "the use of the channels of interstate
commerce,"251 it is physically impossible for an object that does not
exist to use the channels of anything. A self-created object does not
exist until an individual creates it. Also, a self-created object does
not exist as separate components that travel through interstate
channels because the existence of such an object also requires the
ingenuity and inventiveness of a human mind and human labor.
Therefore, so long as a person is merely possessing such an object,
that act of possession cannot make "use of the channels of inter
state commerce."252
As to the second category, that of "things in interstate com
merce,"253 it is also impossible for an object that only exists as a
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 1134-36.
Id. at 1134-36 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
Id.
/d.; see Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1136.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
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unique type once a person has created it to be considered such a
thing. Although its components traveled through interstate chan
nels, the object itself could not have done so, because the object did
not exist until it was produced by a human being. Furthermore, its
uniqueness means that it is not a commodity that is already availa
ble through commercial channels and so it cannot be considered to
be essentially commercial. Therefore, the act of merely possessing
such an object cannot encompass a "thing[] in interstate
commerce."254
However, the question whether the mere possession of a self
created object can ever fall under the third category of Lopez, that
of "activities having a substantial relation to interstate com
merce,"255 is more complicated. Here, the Morrison test is helpful,
as summarized by the Stewart court.256 The Morrison test is in
tended to determine whether an activity "substantially affects" in
terstate commerce,257 that is, whether it falls under the third Lopez
category and therefore can be constitutionally regulated by
Congress. 258
The second prong of the Morrison test, "whether an express
jurisdictional element is provided in the statute to limit its
reach,"259 can be dispensed with immediately. Even if Congress
were to include a jurisdictional element in a statute prohibiting the
mere possession of a self-created object, its inclusion does not sup
port Congressional authority for such a prohibition absent fulfill
ment of the first and fourth prongs of the Morrison test.260
The third prong of the Morrison test, "whether Congress made
express findings about the effects of the proscribed activity on inter
state commerce,"261 is also easily done away with. If Congress were
to make such findings, these findings would likely become the basis
for including a jurisdictional element in the statute, so it is impor
tant to note that the second and third prongs of the Morrison test
are closely related. However, such findings are even more closely
related to the first and fourth prongs of the test. 262
254.
255.
256.
1136-37.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

/d.; see Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1136.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-12 (2000); Stewart, 348 F.3d at

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-09.
Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1136 (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-12).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609-12.
Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1136 (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612).
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.
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The first prong is "whether the regulated activity is commercial
or economic in nature."263 If a proscribed activity is not commer
cial or economic, thereby failing the first prong, it would be impos
sible for Congress to find that the activity affects interstate
commerce because any activity affecting commerce is, by definition,
commercial in nature. The fourth prong is "whether the link be
tween the prohibited activity and the effect on interstate commerce
is attenuated."264 Any activity with a merely attenuated link to in
terstate commerce would fail the fourth prong, and therefore also
make it impossible for Congress to find that such activity substan
tially effects interstate commerce.
Clearly, an activity cannot meet the third prong of the Morri
son test unless it also meets the first and fourth prongs, and it is not
likely to meet the second prong if it does not meet the third prong.
The only reason the third prong exists is to "enable [the Court] to
evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question sub
stantially affect[s] interstate commerce ...."265 Because there is no
requirement that Congress make findings concerning an activity's
burden on interstate commerce, this prong exists only as an aid to
judicial determination, not as a requirement. 266 It is therefore es
sential to determine whether mere possession of a self-created ob
ject can ever meet the first and fourth prongs of the Morrison test.
Can mere possession of a self-created object ever be "commer
cial or economic in nature"?267 Possession is an intrastate activity.
The Supreme Court said in Lopez that Wickard v. Filburn 268 "is
perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause au
thority over intrastate activity."269 Does Wickard say anything
about the act of possession?
In Wickard, Roscoe C. Filburn sought an injunction and a de
claratory judgment against Claude R. Wickard, Secretary of Agri
culture, for assessing a marketing penalty against him under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. 270 Wickard had assessed this
penalty because Filburn had grown more wheat than the Act al
lowed, even though this excess wheat was mostly for consumption
263. Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1136 (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-11).
264. Id. at 1136-37 (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612).
265. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563
(1995» (second alteration in original).
266. Id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562).
267. Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1136 (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-11).
268. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
269. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
270. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 112-13.
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on Filburn's own farm.271 Filburn argued that the production and
consumption of wheat are "local in character" and have no more
than an indirect effect on interstate commerce, therefore the Act
exceeded the reach of the Commerce Clause. 272 The Supreme
Court, however, ruled that such activities may affect interstate com
merce because, even if the wheat was never marketed, "it supplies a
need of the man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by
purchases in the open market. Home-grown wheat in this sense
competes with wheat in commerce."273
The Stewart court looked to Wickard in considering whether
Stewart's possession of self-created machine guns was a commercial
or economic activity.274 The court distinguished Stewart's posses
sion of self-created machine guns from Wickard's production and
consumption of wheat by holding that only the latter was an eco
nomic activity: "[W]here growing wheat in one's backyard could be
seen as a means of saving money that would otherwise have been
spent in the open market, a homemade machine gun may be part of
a gun collection or may be crafted as a hobby."275 The court ruled
that mere possession of a machine gun is not an economic
activity.276
Mere possession of any self-created object is never an eco
nomic activity. Filburn's wheat was not self-created; it was not a
unique type of wheat in the sense that Stewart's machine guns were
a unique type of machine gun. Filburn was producing a commodity
that easily could have taken the place of identical commodities in
the market. However, the person who creates an object of a type
that never existed before is not creating a commodity that can oth
erwise be bought on the market. The self-created object does not
exist on the market and so cannot be bought on the market. Merely
possessing a self-created object is therefore not an economic
activity.
Can mere possession of a self-created object ever meet the
fourth prong of the Morrison test?277 That is, can any link between
mere possession of a self-created object and its "effect on interstate
271.
272.
273.
274.
125 S. Ct.
275.
276.
277.

Id. at 114-15.
[d. at 119.
[d. at 128.
United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1137 (2003), vacated and remanded,
2899 (2005).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1136-37 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,612 (2000».
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commerce" ever be more than attenuated?278 If Wickard is read as
the "most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over
intrastate activity[,]"279 then the answer is no. In Wickard, the
Court ruled that Filburn's production and consumption of wheat in
excess of the legal quota impacted commerce because it replaced
wheat purchases that Filburn would have otherwise made in the
open market.280 However, the Court also noted that "[c]ommerce
among the states in wheat is large and important"281 and that the
"effect of consumption of home-grown wheat on interstate com
merce is due to the fact that it constitutes the most variable factor
in the disappearance of the wheat crop."282 Commerce among self
created objects, however, cannot rise to the level of "large and im
portant"283 because self-created objects are always unique items.
They cannot otherwise be bought in the open market. Therefore,
they cannot ever have more than an attenuated link to interstate
commerce and they cannot meet the fourth prong of the Morrison
test.
Because the mere possession of self-created objects must nec
essarily fail the Morrison test, such possession must also necessarily
lie beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause. The commerce
power therefore does not give Congress the authority to prohibit
the mere possession of self-created objects.
IV.

NEW DEVELOPMENTS: DOES GONZALES V. RAICH
CHANGE ANYTHING?

On June 13, 2005, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Ap
peals for the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Stewart, and remanded this
case for "further consideration in light of" the Supreme Court's re
cent ruling in Gonzales v. Raich. 284 Gonzales addresses whether
the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), as applied to individ
uals who grow marijuana for medical use, is constitutional under
the Commerce Clause. 285 The CSA makes it "unlawful for any per
son [to] knowingly or intentionally ... possess with intent to manu
278. Id. at 1136-37 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000».
279. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
280. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
281. Id. at 125.
282. Id. at 127.
283. Id. at 125.
284. United States v. Stewart, 125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005) (referencing Gonzales v.
Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005».
285. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2198-99.
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facture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance."286
However, California's Compassionate Use Act authorizes the use,
and therefore the possession, of a controlled substance, i.e. mari
juana, for medical purposes. 287
Gonzales respondent Diane Monson is a California resident
who suffers from "a variety of serious medical conditions."288 Mon
son's physician, a board-certified family practitioner, had pre
scribed "a host of conventional medicines" to treat Monson's
conditions, and concluded that "marijuana is the only drug availa
ble that provides effective treatment."289 Monson grew her own
marijuana plants for her personal medical use. 290 County deputy
sheriffs and federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
agents came to Monson's home to investigate her marijuana-related
activities. 291 Although the county officials determined that Mon
son's "use of marijuana was entirely lawful as a matter of California
law[,]" the DEA agents seized and destroyed Monson's marijuana
plants. 292 Monson brought an action against the Attorney General
of the United States and against the head of the DEA, claiming that
their enforcement of the CSA against her violated the Commerce
Clause. 293 Specifically, Monson argued that the CSA's "prohibition
of the manufacture and possession of marijuana as applied to the
intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical
purposes . . . exceeds Congress' authority under the Commerce
Clause."294
The Supreme Court determined that of the three categories
under which Congress may exercise its Commerce Clause authority,
only the third category, that of "activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce[,]" was implicated in Gonzales. 295 The Court
then relied heavily on Wickard to resolve whether the intrastate
possession of marijuana does have a substantial effect on interstate
286. 21 U.S.c.A. § 841(a)(I) (West 2002).
287. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 11362.5, 11362.7-11362.9 (West Supp.
2005).
288. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2199.
289. Id. at 2200.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 2204-05.
295. Id. at 2205 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), NRLB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937». The three categories under which
Congress may exercise its Commerce Clause authority are also set forth in United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995), supra text accompanying notes 153-57.
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commerce, stating that its "decision in Wickard is of particular rele
vance. . . . The similarities between [Gonzales] and Wickard are
striking."296
The Court noted that Monson, like Filburn, the wheat farmer
in Wickard, was "cultivating, for home consumption, a fungible
commodity for which there is an established, albeit illegal, inter
state market."297 Just as Congress had a rational basis for conclud
ing that the unregulated consumption of "home-grown wheat"
would "have a substantial influence on price and market condi
tions" Congress had a rational basis for concluding that leaving
"home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would similarly
affect price and market conditions."298 The Court held that it made
no difference that the interstate market for marijuana is unlawful,
because the Commerce Clause gives Congress the "power to pro
hibit commerce in a particular commodity [even an illegal one]."299
What mattered to the Court is that unregulated home-grown medi
cal marijuana substantially affects the interstate market by creating
"an economic incentive" for physicians to prescribe this drug, which
"can only increase the supply of marijuana in the California mar
ket."300 Given the fact that several other states have also "author
ized the use of medical marijuana," this increased supply will
encourage "unscrupulous people [to] make use of the California
[medical marijuana] exemptions to serve their commercial ends."301
The Court therefore ruled that the Commerce Clause reaches the
intrastate possession of medical marijuana. 302
The Supreme Court's decision to remand Stewart for "further
consideration in light of" Gonzales 303 raises two issues that are rele
vant to this Note's focus. The first issue is whether Gonzales is
likely to affect the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's ruling in
Stewart. The second issue is whether Gonzales has settled the ques
tion whether the Commerce Clause reaches to self-created objects.

296. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2206.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 2207.
299. Id. at 2207 n.29.
300. Id. at 2213-14.
301. Id. at 2214.
302. Id. at 2209.
303. United States v. Stewart, 125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005) (referencing Gonzales, 125
S. Ct. 2195).
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Is the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Likely to
1?everse Stevvart?

The Stewart court did not consider whether § 922(0) is vvholly
unconstitutional. The court ruled only that § 922(0) is unconstitu
tional as applied to the unique facts of Stevvart's case. 304 The court
based its ruling on the following considerations:
(1) Stewart's machine guns were a "unique type of firearm" that
Stewart created in his home out of non-machine gun parts that
traveled interstate; therefore the machine guns themselves never
existed in interstate commerce "in any recognizable form."305
(2) Stewart therefore did not "use the channels of interstate com
merce" to obtain his machine guns, and so his act of possession
does not fall within the first category under which Congress may
exercise its Commerce Clause authority.306
(3) Because the machine guns never traveled in interstate com
merce, Stewart's act of possession did not concern "things in in
terstate commerce" and so did not fall under the second category
under which Congress may exercise its Commerce Clause
authority.30?
(4) Therefore, Congress cannot regulate Stewart's act of posses
sion unless that act had "a substantial relation to interstate com
merce[,]" that is, unless that act fell within the third category
under which Congress may exercise its Commerce Clause
authority.308
(5) Stewart's act of possession is not an activity that is substan
tially related to interstate commerce under the Morrison test. 309

The Stewart court also found support for its conclusion that
§ 922(0)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Stevvart by distinguish
ing Stewart from Wickard. 310 The court found that unlike the con
sumption of home-grown wheat, vvhich diminishes the vvheat
market, mere possession of a machine gun is not an economic
activity.311
This distinction is likely to hold up vvhen the court reconsiders
Stewart in light of Gonzales, for tvvo reasons. The first reason is
304. United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated and
remanded, 125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005).
305. Id. at 1136.
306. Id. at 1134-36 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995».
307. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558).
308. Id. at 1134, 1136 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59).
309. Supra text accompanying notes 237-43.
310. Supra text accompanying notes 274-76.
311. Id.
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that to reverse its ruling, the court must find that Stewart's posses
sion of self-created machine guns passes the Morrison test and
therefore had a "substantial relation to interstate commerce."312
Gonzales provides no guidance here, because Gonzales is silent
concerning self-created objects. The Gonzales Court found only
that home-grown medical marijuana effects interstate commerce
because marijuana is a fungible commodity for which there is an
interstate market. 313 The Court was concerned that unregulated
home-grown marijuana would increase the market supply and at
tract "unscrupulous people" willing to exploit the medical mari
juana exemptions for commercial ends. 314
Stewart's machine guns, like all self-created objects, are not a
fungible commodity because they do not exist on the marketplace.
His mere possession of these self-created objects does not impact
the limited market for machine guns because, unlike marijuana and
Filburn's wheat, they are unique sui generis objects that cannot be
bought anywhere else. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
based its finding that Stewart's mere possession of self-created ma
chine guns failed to impact interstate commerce on the fact of their
uniqueness. 315 As nothing in Gonzales addresses the market im
pact of unique, non-fungible objects, it is likely that the Stewart
court will not change its finding in light of Gonzales.
Furthermore, the Gonzales Court relied heavily on Wickard,
stating that the "similarities between [Gonzales] and Wickard are
striking."316 Both Wickard and Gonzales conclude that the Com
merce Clause reaches to the mere possession of home-grown natu
ral substances when such possession affects the interstate market
for those substances. 317 The Stewart court, however, distinguished
Wickard. 318 The court stated:
[By] crafting his own guns and working out of his own home,
Stewart functioned outside the commercial gun market. His ac
tivities obviously did not increase machinegun demand. Nor can
we say that Stewart's homemade machineguns reduced overall
demand. Unlike wheat, for example, which is a staple commod
312. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 610-12 (2000).
313. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2206 (2005)).
314. Id. at 2213-14.
315. Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1135.
316. Gonzales, 125 S.Ct. at 2206.
317. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942); Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2213-14.
318. Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1138.
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ity that Filburn would probably have had to buy, had he not
grown it himself, there is no reason to think Stewart would ever
have bought a machinegun from a commercial source, had he
been precluded by law from building one himself. . .. Thus, the
link between Stewart's activity and its effect on interstate com
merce is simply too tenuous to justify federal regulation. 319

It is therefore likely that the Stewart court will not apply the
Supreme Court's Wickard-based ruling to Stewart's particular cir
cumstances, especially in light of the fact that Gonzales does not
consider whether the Commerce Clause reaches unique, self-cre
ated objects.
B.

Has Gonzales Settled Whether the Commerce Clause Reaches
to Self-Created Objects?

Even if the Stewart court does reverse its decision in light of
Gonzales, such a reversal is not likely to impact the larger question
of the Commerce Clause's reach to self-created objects because
Stewart was decided on an as-applied basis.320 This means that even
if the Stewart court does find that § 922(0)(1) is constitutional as
applied to Stewart's particular situation, it will not preclude other
individuals in other circumstances from challenging § 922(0)(1) or
any other law that gets applied to the possession of a self-created
object. Furthermore, because the Gonzales Court's reasoning,
holdings, and ruling are based on the facts surrounding a fungible
commodity that is widely available on the marketplace 321 and not
on a unique, self-created object for which no market exists, Gonza
les is not applicable to self-created objects.
CONCLUSION

The lack of legislative history and Congressional findings sup
porting § 922(0)(1) proves that Congress has never made a finding
linking mere possession of machine guns with interstate commerce.
The appeals courts that have upheld the constitutionality of
§ 922(0) have done so by erroneously applying legislative history
that concerned firearms in general to machine guns in particular, or
by misreading the statute itself and confusing its prohibition of the
act of possessing a machine gun with a regulation of machine guns
themselves. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that
319.
320.
321.

Id.
Id. at 1140.
Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. at 2206.
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§ 922(0) is unconstitutional when applied to a person who made his

own machine guns from various parts obtained through interstate
channels, because in such a case § 922(0) prohibits mere possession,
not transfer, of an object; an activity that has no connection to in
terstate commerce.
Because § 922(0) prohibits activities that have no connection
to interstate commerce it should be struck down as wholly unconsti
tutional. Congress may not constitutionally prohibit the mere pos
session of self-created objects. Mere possession of such objects fails
the Morrison test, and therefore such possession lies beyond the
reach of the Commerce Clause.
Karen A. Michalson

